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WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD 
STOP GVR’ING THE SOLICITOR 
GENERAL’S RATIONALE-
CONFESSIONS-OF-ERROR 
“Once we accept a confession of error at face value and make it 
the controlling and decisive factor in our decision, we no longer 
administer a system of justice under a government of laws.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1988, Horacio Alvarado was sentenced to three years in prison 
for extortion and conspiracy to commit extortion.
2
 Described as half 
black and half Puerto Rican, Alvarado appealed his conviction, 
claiming that the federal prosecutor discriminatorily exercised 
peremptory challenges during jury selection, violating Batson v. 
Kentucky.
3
 Batson prohibits prosecutors from challenging potential 
jurors based exclusively on their race.
4
 Without ruling on whether 
Alvarado had shown a prima facie Batson error, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed Alvarado’s 
conviction.
5
 The court instead held that as long as the jury constituted 
a “fair cross-section of the community,” Alvarado had not been 
denied an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment.
6
 
                                                                                                                 
1 Casey v. United States, 343 U.S. 808, 812 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
2 United States v. Alvarado, 891 F.2d 439, 440 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. granted, vacated and 
remanded, 497 U.S. 543 (1990) (per curiam). 
3 Alvarado, 891 F.2d at 440 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).  
4 Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. 
5 Alvarado, 891 F.2d at 444 (“In this case, we need not determine whether [the 
prosecutor’s] minority challenges establishes a prima facie case of discriminatory peremptory 
challenges.”). 
6 Id. at 445 (emphasis added) (quoting Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214, 229 (2d Cir. 
1987)): 
[O]ur task in assessing a claim of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges on 
appeal from a conviction is to determine whether the group alleged to have been 
impermissibly challenged is ‘significantly underrepresented’ in the jury that 
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Alvarado petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court, arguing 
that the Second Circuit should have analyzed his appeal under Batson 
rather than the Sixth Amendment’s cross-section approach. 
Confessing error, the Solicitor General agreed. In spite of the 
conceded error, however, the Solicitor urged the Court to deny 
certiorari because the Second Circuit had reached the correct result.
7
 
The Solicitor General contended that because Alvarado failed to make 
a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination, even if the 
Second Circuit had properly applied Batson, the outcome would have 
been the same.
8
 Thus, the Solicitor General believed that the final 
disposition of the case was correct despite an erroneous rationale. 
The Supreme Court ignored the Solicitor General’s 
recommendation and GVR’d (granted certiorari, vacated the 
judgment below, and remanded for further consideration)
 9
 the case to 
the Second Circuit “for further consideration in light of the position 
asserted by the Government.”10 This response by the Court was 
                                                                                                                 
 
convicted the appellant. In the absence of such underrepresentation, the Sixth 
Amendment right to the unimpeded possibility that the jury will be a fair cross-
section of the community has not been violated. 
7 See Brief for the United States in Opposition at 2, Alvarado v. United States, 497 U.S. 
543 (1990) (per curiam) (No. 89–6985): 
We agree with petitioner that the rationale on which the court below relied in 
affirming his conviction is inconsistent with the general approach to the issue of 
racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges that this Court 
employed in Batson. For the reasons set forth below, however, we do not agree that 
the judgment of the court of appeals in this case warrants review by this Court. 
See also Alvarado v. United States, 497 U.S. 543, 544 (1990) (per curiam) (describing the 
government’s confession of error and arguing that the Second Circuit’s decision was erroneous, 
contrary to Batson, and discredited by the Court’s decision in Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 
480–81 (1990) (stating that the cross-section concept of the Sixth Amendment was inapplicable 
to a petit jury, the type of jury which convicted Alvarado)). 
8 See Brief for the United States in Opposition, supra note 7, at 5–6: 
[W]hile the Second Circuit’s analysis was facially different from the analysis this 
Court prescribed in Batson, the factor that the court of appeals found dispositive in 
this case—the representative composition of the jury—would be an important factor 
under conventional Batson analysis in establishing that there was no prima facie case 
of discrimination in the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges. As a result, 
few if any cases will come out differently under the two approaches. As we have 
indicated in our analysis of the case under the principles of Batson, this is certainly 
not a case that would be decided differently depending on which route the court took 
to its decision. 
9 While this Note focuses on a narrow aspect of the Court’s GVR practice—GVR’ing 
where the Government believes that an inferior court used faulty analysis—an in-depth look at 
the Court’s multifaceted GVR practice can be found in Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Supreme 
Court’s Controversial GVRs—And an Alternative, 107 MICH. L. REV. 711 (2009). 
10 Alvarado, 497 U.S. at 545. 
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somewhat controversial. Four Justices dissented, expressing concern 
at the Court’s use of a summary vacatur where the Solicitor defended 
the judgment of the lower court and only criticized its rationale.
11
 
While Alvarado is one of the clearest examples of the Court’s GVR 
practice in the face of a confession of error only in a lower court’s 
rationale, the Court has frequently followed this practice in the past 
several decades.
12
 
Even though academic commentary on the merits of this 
“rationale-confession-of-error” practice is sparse, it certainly warrants 
critical review. The Court has asserted that GVR’ing the Solicitor 
General’s rationale-confession-of-error has a few important benefits. 
Specifically, GVR’ing helps the Supreme Court control its docket.13 It 
also gives both the Supreme Court and lower courts the benefit of 
fuller consideration of outcome-determinative issues.
14
 In that vein, it 
also allows possible circuit splits to percolate before the Court applies 
its consideration.
15
 And finally, it serves as a tool of equity and 
fairness to the petitioner.
16
 
On the other hand, these benefits are countered by significant 
problems. GVR’ing without independently reviewing the merits of a 
rationale-confession-of-error assumes that an actual error has 
occurred.
17
 This assumption essentially places the Solicitor General in 
a tenth seat on the Supreme Court, which offends separation of 
powers.
18
 Moreover, when the Solicitor General confesses error in a 
lower court’s rationale and asks the Court to GVR, the government 
may be motivated by litigation strategy rather than the fair and 
impartial administration of justice.
19
 Strategic litigation tactics by the 
                                                                                                                 
11 Id. at 545 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
12 See, e.g., Machado v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 1236 (2010); Tapia-Acuna v. INS, 449 U.S. 
945 (1980). 
13 See Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 167 (1996) (“In an appropriate case, a GVR 
order conserves the scarce resources of this Court that might otherwise be expended on plenary 
consideration . . . and alleviates the ‘[p]otential for unequal treatment’ that is inherent in our 
ability to grant plenary review of all pending cases raising similar issues.”) (quoting United 
States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 556, n.16 (1982)). 
14 See id. (“[A] GVR order . . . assists the court below by flagging a particular issue that it 
does not appear to have fully considered . . . .”). 
15 See Stutson v. United States, 516 U.S. 193, 196 (1996) (claiming it will be useful for 
the Court to have the views of the court of appeals before making its decision). 
16 See Lawrence, 516 U.S. at 167. 
17 See Price v. United States, 537 U.S. 1152, 1157–58 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that a Fifth Circuit judgment should not be set aside because the government had not 
conceded error in the court of appeals’ judgment, even if the reasoning may have been 
incorrect). 
18 See infra note 175 and accompanying text (describing the Solicitor General’s role as a 
de facto Supreme Court Justice). 
19 See infra note 178 and accompanying text (discussing the Solicitor General’s practice 
of confessing error to avoid a ruling adverse to the government’s interests). 
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government may, in some circumstances, allow the government to 
control the development of the law, particularly in criminal law, 
where confession of error is most prevalent.
20
 By granting the 
Solicitor’s request, the Court encourages such abuse.  
Finally, GVR’ing rationale-confessions-of-error has a negative 
impact on the lower courts that must reevaluate the remanded cases. 
Because of the summary nature of the GVR, lower courts may be 
confused as to what the Court expects of them.
21
 And, although the 
Court directs the lower court to evaluate the Solicitor General’s 
suggested error, in some instances the government has changed that 
position again after remand.
22
 Therefore, the ultimate determination 
of such a case is as much in the prosecutor’s hands as it is in the 
court’s. 
The central claim of this Note is that these problems outweigh the 
benefits of GVR’ing rationale-confessions-of-error. While controlling 
the docket, seeking fuller analysis of important issues from the lower 
court, and pursuing fairness for the litigants are important 
considerations, allowing the government to engage in manipulative 
litigation tactics, which, in turn, negatively affect the lower courts, 
has a much longer and devastating impact on the judicial system. This 
Note, therefore, analyzes both the benefits and problems with 
GVR’ing rationale-confessions-of-error, and proposes a solution to 
the imbalance.  
Part I describes the background of the Solicitor General’s 
confession-of-error practice, focusing on the various types of 
rationale-confession-of-error that have cropped up in the past two 
decades, and details the history of the Supreme Court’s controversial 
response. Part II weighs the benefits and the problems with GVR’ing 
rationale-confessions-of-error described above. And Part III suggests 
a practical solution to the controversy: denying certiorari in all 
rationale-confession-of-error cases unless the Solicitor General can 
identify a controlling error of law. But, because this blanket rule may 
be unproductive in some cases, Part III further suggests an exception 
where (1) the petitioner claims that a constitutional right or standard 
was violated or ignored in a prior proceeding, or by some other 
government actor such as a police officer, (2) the lower court did not 
                                                                                                                 
20 See David M. Rosenzweig, Confession of Error in the Supreme Court by the Solicitor 
General, 82 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2080–81 (1994) (noting that “[t]he vast majority of confessions of 
error occur in criminal cases”). 
21 See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the negative impact of GVR’ing on lower courts). 
22 See, e.g., United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 746 (3d Cir. 1994) (“In its brief after 
remand, the government recedes somewhat from the view implied by its Supreme Court brief 
that the depiction must show the child subject to have some lascivious intent.”). 
 2/14/2012 4:30:52 PM 
2012] RATIONALE-CONFESSIONS-OF-ERROR 883 
fully address or answer that claim, and (3) it is reasonably probable 
that the legal standard that the lower court did not consider, or 
ignored, would change the case’s outcome. Only in these instances 
would a GVR in light of a rationale-confession-of-error be proper. 
I. BACKGROUND ON THE SOLICITOR GENERAL’S CONFESSION OF 
ERROR AND THE SUPREME COURT’S RESPONSE 
A. Definition, Foundation, and Practice 
Attorneys for the federal government are charged with ensuring 
“fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans.”23 
Unlike private litigants, they are not to win cases at any cost. Instead, 
government attorneys must pursue the public interest in exercising 
their duties.
24
 Under this obligation, the Solicitor General has 
developed the practice of confessing error: informing the Court that 
an error occurred in a proceeding below, which prejudiced the 
petitioner’s case, despite a favorable outcome for the government.25  
The Solicitor General’s confession of error practice stands on two 
foundational pillars. First, the Solicitor General enjoys unique 
independence within the executive branch, and has broad autonomy 
in determining the government’s position on cases coming before the 
Court.
26
 Such independence is commonly understood as crucial to the 
relationship between the Supreme Court and the Solicitor General. 
The Court trusts that the Solicitor General will not make arguments 
that are overly influenced by the political leanings of the executive.
27
 
                                                                                                                 
23 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., FISCAL YEAR 2010 
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT I–1 (Nov. 9, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/ag/annualreports/pr2010/par2010.pdf. 
24 See Hon. Archibald Cox, The Government in the Supreme Court, 44 CHI. B. REC. 221, 
223 (1963) (“The United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the 
courts.”) (quoting Solicitor General Frederick W. Lehman). 
25 See Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 258 (1942) (“The public trust reposed in the 
law enforcement officers of the Government requires that they be quick to confess error when, 
in their opinion, a miscarriage of justice may result from their remaining silent.”). 
26 See 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(a) (2010) (stating that the Solicitor General has general control 
over the government’s cases coming before the Supreme Court); Rosenzweig, supra note 20, at 
2083–85 (noting that while current statutes clearly make the Solicitor General a subordinate of 
the Attorney General, the Solicitor controls virtually all of the government’s appellate litigation 
and makes all arguments before the Supreme Court with little interference from other officers of 
the executive branch); Note, Government Litigation in the Supreme Court: The Roles of the 
Solicitor General, 78 YALE L.J. 1442, 1444 (1969) (stating the Solicitor General’s independence 
creates conflict between the many roles of his office). On some occasions, the Solicitor General 
does confer with the Attorney General regarding the administration’s position in cases that may 
have a greater political impact or in which the executive may have a great political interest. Id. 
at 1444. 
27 See Rosenzweig, supra note 20, at 2088–92 (discussing the problems created by Rex 
Lee, Charles Fried, and the Reagan Administration when the executive branch took a much 
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Similarly, the Attorney General trusts that the Solicitor will represent 
the government beneficially before the Court.
28
 Thus, when the 
Solicitor General confesses error, both the Attorney General and the 
Court trust that the confession is well thought out and supportable. 
The Court has greater reason to trust the Solicitor General in 
confessions of error, however, because in confessing error the 
Solicitor is generally “arguing against [the government’s] own 
interests.”29 Independence and autonomy from the executive, as well 
as the Court’s trust, allow the Solicitor General to admit the 
shortcomings of a lower court’s decision, even though the 
government was the prevailing party in that lower court’s decision.30  
Second, the practice of confessing error springs from the Solicitor 
General’s function as a filter for the Court.31 Because the Solicitor 
General participates in a large percentage of cases that come before 
the Court, he has a unique ability to advise the Court on which cases 
warrant plenary review and which do not. One prominent 
commentator stated that “[a] principal chore of the Solicitor’s office 
is to help the Supreme Court set its docket by screening petitions for 
                                                                                                                 
 
more active and politicized role in the Solicitor General’s work in an effort to shape 
constitutional law). 
28 See LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE 
OF LAW 24 (1987) (“The SG’s office serves as a buffer between the Judiciary and the Executive 
Branch.”). Because such trust is crucial for both the Court and the executive, intellectual 
prowess and peerless advocacy are requirements of the Solicitor General. See Note, supra note 
26, at 1444 (noting that the Solicitor General’s autonomy is in part “a function of the stature of 
the men occupying the position”); see also Stefanie A. Lepore, The Development of the Supreme 
Court Practice of Calling for the Views of the Solicitor General, 35 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 35, 36–37 
(2010) (noting that when appointing a new Solicitor General, the President uses the same 
criteria used for nominating a Supreme Court Justice). 
29 See Andrew Hessick, The Impact of Government Appellate Strategies on the 
Development of Criminal Law, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 477, 483–84 (2009) (stating that courts 
“almost always agree with the reason the government gives for its confession . . . in part because 
a court is probably more inclined to trust the government when the government is arguing 
against its own interests”); see also Note, supra note 26, at 1443 (“If the Solicitor General 
believes that the government’s position is legally untenable, he may confess error, an action 
which is generally dispositive.”). 
30 See Note, supra note 26, at 1444 (commenting that a major component of the Solicitor 
General’s role, which allows him to confess error “is the degree of independence which the 
Solicitor General enjoys”). 
31 See FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 96 (1994) (“[T]he traditional 
specialization of [the Solicitor General’s] office has led it to be keenly attuned to [the Supreme] 
Court’s practice with respect to the granting or denying of petitions for certiorari.”); Note, supra 
note 26, at 1453–54 (describing the important function the Solicitor General plays in the Court’s 
certiorari process as that of a filter, particularly in cases where the government is the petitioner). 
The “filtering function” of the Solicitor General can also be extended to cases where the 
government is respondent because he submits Briefs in Opposition to Certiorari which suggest 
to the Court reasons why certiorari should or should not be granted. See supra note 7 and 
accompanying text. 
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writs of certiorari.”32 By conceding to the Court that a judgment or an 
analysis in its favor below is erroneous, instead of zealously pushing 
for the government’s interests at all costs, the Solicitor General helps 
the Court summarily dispose of those cases and focus its time and 
energy on cases which are more deserving of its review.
33
 Therefore, 
where the Solicitor General believes that a ruling below in the 
government’s favor is wrong, he serves as a filter for the Court and 
validates the Court’s trust in him by confessing error.  
Confessions of error are made for a variety of reasons. The 
Solicitor General may believe that a lower court made a legal, factual, 
or procedural error in its ruling.
34
 A government attorney at trial or on 
appeal may have violated a discretionary Department of Justice policy 
which, if followed, would have barred prosecution.
35
 Finally, as 
shown in Alvarado, the Solicitor General may believe that a lower 
court’s analysis of a case is erroneous without saying that the 
judgment is wrong. This last form of confession of error has been 
used with greater frequency in recent years,
36
 including two cases 
decided during the October 2009 Term.
37
 In this rationale-confession-
of-error, the Solicitor General will sometimes argue that the judgment 
                                                                                                                 
32 CAPLAN, supra note 28, at 257. 
33 See Rosenzweig, supra note 20, at 2107 (“[C]onfessions of error . . . [are] a desirable 
extension of the Solicitor General’s gatekeeping function at the certiorari stage . . . [and] assist 
the Court by identifying the few cases in which clear error has been committed.”). 
34 Id. at 2082; see also, e.g., Gordon v. United States, 347 U.S. 909, 910 (1954) (per 
curiam) (remanding to the district court after the government confessed that the convicting jury 
was improperly instructed). 
35 See Rosenzweig, supra note 20, at 2094 (“Since the middle of this century, one of the 
most common grounds for confessions of error has been that a conviction was obtained in 
violation of a discretionary Justice Department policy, which, if properly applied, would have 
precluded the prosecution.”); Note, supra note 26, at 1471 (“Confessions of error demonstrate to 
the Court and the staff of the Justice Department that deviations from policy will not be 
permitted to succeed, and thus act as an internal control device.”); see also, e.g., Watts v. United 
States, 422 U.S. 1032, 1033 (1975) (accepting the Solicitor General’s confession of error that 
the federal prosecution “did not conform to the Department of Justice policy of not prosecuting 
individuals previously tried in a state court for offenses involving the same acts,” and remanding 
the case to the district court to allow the government to dismiss its charges against the 
petitioner) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
36 See Rosenzweig, supra note 20, at 2101 (noting that cases where the Court ignored the 
recommendation of the Solicitor General and summarily reversed the judgment below, despite 
the Solicitor General’s position that error was harmless or that the cases should not be granted 
certiorari review, have been particularly noticeable in recent history). 
37 See Machado v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 1236, 1236 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(dissenting because the government had not conceded an error in judgment by the court of 
appeals, and the Court had not independently reviewed the merits of the judgment below, so 
there were insufficient grounds to vacate and remand) (citing Nunez v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 
2990, 2990 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (mem.)); Williamson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 3461 
(2010) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (dissenting for the same reasons as in Machado) (citing 
Nunez, 128 S. Ct. at 2990 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
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is correct despite the erroneous rationale.
38
 In other instances, the 
Solicitor may take no position on the judgment at all.
39
  
Depending on how erroneous a lower court’s rationale is believed 
to be, the Solicitor General generally suggests either that the Court 
deny certiorari because the judgment was correct and any error was 
inconsequential,
40
 or that the Court should vacate the judgment and 
remand the case for further consideration by the lower court despite a 
possibly correct judgment.
41
 Where the Solicitor General suggests 
that review is not warranted in light of a correct judgment, he will 
often also argue that some other additional reason exists for denying 
review, such as the limited precedential value of the lower court’s 
decision. For example, in Alvarado, the government cited Holland v. 
Illinois as an additional reason why granting Alvarado review was 
unnecessary.
42
 Holland held that the Sixth Amendment was 
inapplicable to peremptory challenges of venire members, therefore 
discrediting the Second Circuit’s “fair cross-section” analysis in 
Alvarado and the line of earlier cases on which it relied.
43
 By citing to 
Holland, the Solicitor implied that since Holland did the heavy lifting 
of removing any precedential value of the erroneous Alvarado 
rationale, and the judgment itself was otherwise correct, the Court had 
no other reason to grant review.
44
  
                                                                                                                 
38 See, e.g., Alvarado v. United States, 497 U.S. 543, 544 (1990) (per curiam): 
The United States agrees that the Court of Appeals erred . . . [but] the Government 
urges [the Court] to deny certiorari . . . because petitioner failed to make out a prima 
facie case of intentional discrimination and because the reasons given for the 
challenges were race-neutral grounds for decision that the Court of Appeals did not 
reach. 
39 See, e.g., Brief for the Respondent at 22–23, Machado v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 1236 
(2010) (No. 08–7721), 2009 WL 369341 (recommending that the Court grant certiorari, vacate 
the judgment below, and remand the case without ever taking a position that the judgment itself 
was in error); Price v. United States, 537 U.S. 1152, 1156–57 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the Solicitor General had not conceded that the judgment was in error). 
40 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
41 Machado, 130 S. Ct. at 1236 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that in this case the 
government did not take the position that the court of appeals’ judgment was incorrect but still 
requested a GVR). I say “possibly” because where the government suggests that the case should 
be remanded, it generally does not take a position on whether the judgment is correct, but also 
does not assert that the judgment is incorrect. 
42 Alvarado, 497 U.S. at 544 (citing Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990)). 
43 Brief for the United States in Opposition at 5–6, Alvarado v. United States, 497 U.S. 
543 (1990) (No. 89–6985). 
44 See, e.g., Rosales v. Bureau of Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 545 U.S. 1101 
(2005) (mem.). In Rosales, Solicitor General Paul Clement argued that the Court had no reason 
to grant review of a Fifth Circuit decision denying habeas relief to petitioner, although the Fifth 
Circuit’s analysis was incorrect, because the judgment itself was correct. Thus, Clement argued 
that the court of appeals’ unpublished per curiam opinion did not establish binding precedent 
under the Fifth Circuit’s rules. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 4–5, 9, Rosales v. 
Bureau of Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 545 U.S. 1101 (2005) (No. 04–8465), 2005 
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Where, on the other hand, the Solicitor General has suggested that 
an erroneous rationale warrants remand, he has done so for several 
reasons. The Solicitor General may ask the Court to remand in light 
of a different interpretation of an applicable statute or other binding 
document,
45
 or because the lower court failed to give any analysis to 
an important legal issue.
46
 The Solicitor General contended the latter 
in the October 2009 Term in Machado v. Holder.
47
 Solicitor General 
Elena Kagan argued that a Fourth Circuit decision denying two illegal 
aliens the right to effective assistance of counsel in removal 
proceedings should be vacated and remanded because the court of 
appeals did not review whether the aliens had a nonconstitutional 
right to effective counsel; she did not, however, argue that the Fourth 
Circuit’s judgment was incorrect.48 The Court followed her guidance, 
with four justices dissenting.
49
  
The Solicitor General may also ask the Court to remand in order to 
advance important government interests, such as avoiding the 
invalidation of a significant statute,
50
 protecting executive 
discretion,
51
 or slowing the development of the law.
52
 Knox v. United 
States,
53
 discussed fully in Part II.B.2, demonstrates a situation in 
                                                                                                                 
 
WL 1330298, at *4–*5, *9. 
45 See Nunez v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2990, 2990 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting 
that the remand in this case was based on differing interpretation of scope of collateral-review 
waiver). 
46 See Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 167 (1996) (“[GVR’ing] assists the court below 
by flagging a particular issue that it does not appear to have fully considered.”). 
47 Machado v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 1236, 1236 (2010).  
48 See Brief for the Respondent at 12–13, Machado v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 1236 (2010) (per 
curiam) (No. 08–7721) (arguing that the Court should GVR because the court of appeals failed 
to consider whether the petitioners’ “legal representatives’ performance was deficient for 
purposes of a nonconstitutional remedy”). The Fourth Circuit limited its holding only to 
appellants’ lack of a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Machado v. 
Mukasey, 293 Fed. App’x 217, 219 (4th Cir. 2008).  
49 Machado, 130 S. Ct. at 1236. 
50 See Drew S. Days, III, When the President Says ‘No’: A Few Thoughts on Executive 
Power and the Tradition of Solicitor General Independence, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 509, 
515 (2001) (admitting that he confessed error in Knox v. United States, 510 U.S. 939 (1993), in 
order to avoid the possibility that the Court may have issued a ruling that would “jeopardize 
later child pornography prosecutions . . . ”). 
51 Note, supra note 26, at 1469 (“By confessing error, the Solicitor General often attempts 
to prevent premature or unguided decisions by the Court and to protect the executive’s freedom 
of action from intervention by the Court.”). 
52 Id. at 1470–71 (citing the Solicitor General’s statement to the Court in several 
electronic eavesdropping cases that the Justice Department was analyzing its uses of electronic 
devices to prevent tainted evidence from being introduced at trial as a tactic to stall the 
introduction of tighter judicial standards on electronic eavesdropping). 
53 510 U.S. 939 (1993). 
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which the Solicitor General confessed error and asked for a remand to 
avoid the Court’s invalidation of a federal child pornography law.54 
B. History of The Supreme Court’s Response 
In the beginning, the Court deferred to the Solicitor’s confession 
and remanded, much like it does today, without independently 
reviewing the confession’s merit.55 In 1942, however, the Court 
introduced a policy of independently reviewing each confession of 
error and making its own determination of whether an error occurred, 
no matter the reason for the confessed error. In Young v. United 
States,
56
 the Court stated, “a confession does not relieve this Court of 
the performance of the judicial function. The considered judgment of 
the law enforcement officers that reversible error has been committed 
is entitled to great weight, but our judicial obligations compel us to 
examine independently the errors confessed.”57  
Shortly after the Young opinion, Congress codified the Court’s 
dispositional power, giving the Court broad discretion in disposing 
cases properly before it: 
The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate 
jurisdiction may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse 
any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought 
before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the 
entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or 
require such further proceedings to be had as may be just 
under the circumstances.
58
 
Perhaps due in part to the broad language of 28 U.S.C. § 2106, the 
Court, over time, moved away from the Young standard and settled 
back into the practice of GVR’ing cases in which the Solicitor 
General confessed error.
 59
 Today, the Court commonly responds to 
confessions of error by GVR’ing them without independent review 
and shifting the necessary review to one of the courts below where 
the alleged error occurred.
60
  
                                                                                                                 
54 See infra notes 182–90 and accompanying text.  
55 See, e.g., Overton v. United States, 239 U.S. 658 (1915) (providing an example where 
the Court deferred to the confession of error and the Solicitor General’s motion). 
56 315 U.S. 257 (1942).  
57 Id. at 258–59. 
58 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2006). 
59 See Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 166 (1996) (per curiam) (noting that the GVR 
order has become “an integral part” of the Court’s practice over the past half century). 
60 Compare Levine v. United States, 383 U.S. 265, 266 (1966) (per curiam) (emphasis 
added) (“On the basis of [the Solicitor General’s] concession, and upon consideration of the 
entire record, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals . . . .”), with Machado v. Holder, 
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This general response to all forms of the government’s confession 
of error has generated controversy.
61
 However, automatically 
GVR’ing rationale-confessions-of-error without independently 
reviewing their merits is especially controversial.
62
 First, because the 
Solicitor does not propose that a judgment is incorrect, there is a 
question of whether any error existed in the lower court’s decision. In 
Machado, Chief Justice Roberts argued that deference to the Solicitor 
General’s rationale-confession-of-error was “especially 
inappropriate” because the petitioners “disclaimed any 
nonconstitutional basis for relief.”63 Therefore, because petitioners 
never asked for a nonconstitutional remedy from the court of appeals 
or from the Supreme Court, there was no error in denying them such 
relief.
64
 Chief Justice Roberts concluded that denying certiorari was, 
therefore, a more appropriate disposition than GVR’ing.65 Similarly, 
in Stutson v. United States,
66
 Justice Scalia argued in dissent that an 
actual error is only speculative where (1) the Solicitor General 
repudiated the position asserted by the federal prosecutor in prior 
proceedings; (2) there is no evidence that the court of appeals relied 
on the prosecutor’s theory of the case in forming its ultimate 
judgment; and (3) the Solicitor did not suggest that a lower court’s 
judgment was at all incorrect.
67
 
Second, granting the government’s GVR request without 
independent review encourages manipulative and strategic litigation 
                                                                                                                 
 
130 S. Ct. 1236, 1236 (2010) (emphasis added) (“The judgment is vacated, and the case is 
remanded . . . for further consideration in light of the position asserted by the Solicitor General 
in her brief for the respondent.”). 
61 See EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 346 (9th ed. 2007) (noting 
that there is a substantial disagreement over the propriety of the Court’s GVR practice when the 
Solicitor General confesses error). 
62 See Bruhl, supra note 9, at 732 (footnote omitted): 
All members of the Court now appear comfortable with, or at least resigned to the practice 
of, GVR’ing when the government concedes error in the bottom-line judgment. More 
controversial is the more recent practice of the Court deciding to GVR in cases where the 
government does not admit error in the judgment but instead only in the reasoning below. . . . 
63 Machado, 130 S.Ct. at 1236 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
64 See id. (stating that remanding the case back to the Fourth Circuit for consideration 
upon a theory never proposed by the petitioner is inappropriate). 
65 Id. 
66 516 U.S. 193 (1996). 
67 See Lawrence, 516 U.S. at 184–85(Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the government 
made “no suggestion that the Court of Appeals’ judgment was incorrect” and there is no way to 
know whether the court of appeals even relied on the government’s theory of the case). Note 
that Stutson is a companion case to Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163 (1994). Justice Scalia’s 
dissent in Lawrence also applies to Stutson. See Lawrence, 516 U.S. at 163; Stutson, 516 U.S. at 
198. 
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practices by the Court’s most frequent litigant. In every confession of 
error, the government potentially sacrifices victory. Ideally this 
sacrifice achieves a greater degree of fairness and impartiality in the 
“administration of justice.”68 But, the Solicitor General has also used 
confession of error to avoid dispositions unfavorable to the executive 
or to otherwise further the executive’s interests.69 In cases where the 
Solicitor General asks for a GVR, automatic and uncritical deference 
to the Solicitor virtually gives him a seat on the bench.
70
 The Court’s 
trust in the Solicitor when he confesses error has given him almost 
dispositive control over such cases.
71
 Furthermore, several cases 
suggest that the Solicitor General has confessed error strategically 
rather than out of a sense of fairness or justice.
72
 By taking a longer 
view of issues presented in a case and evaluating the need to preserve 
or slow the development of laws that are important to the 
government’s political interests, the Solicitor General may abuse the 
Court’s trust in his office by confessing error strategically.73 
Finally, GVR’ing rationale-confessions-of-error also has a 
negative impact on lower courts. The summary nature of a GVR gives 
the lower court who receive the remanded case little help in 
determining the proper course of action.
74
 Guidance comes only from 
                                                                                                                 
68 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATT'ORNEY GEN., FISCAL YEAR 2010 
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT I–1 (Nov. 9, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/ag/annualreports/pr2010/par2010.pdf. 
69 See Note, supra note 26, at 1469 (noting that the Solicitor General may confess error in 
order to “prevent premature or unguided decisions by the [Supreme] Court and to protect the 
executive’s freedom of action from intervention by the Court”); see also Judy Sarasohn, SG’s 
Switch Breathes Life Into Bias Suit, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 29, 1993, at 22 (suggesting that the 
Solicitor General’s confession of error on a procedural issue in a Title VII suit was to avoid an 
exploitation of the complexities of Title VII and the need to defend such suits as strenuously as 
previous administrations). 
70 Mariscal v. United States, 449 U.S. 405, 407 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“I 
harbor serious doubt that our adversary system of justice is well served by this Court’s practice 
of routinely vacating judgments which the Solicitor General questions without any independent 
investigation . . . .”). 
71 Id. at 407 (“Congress has given us discretionary jurisdiction to deny certiorari if we do 
not wish to grant plenary consideration to a particular case . . . but it has not to my knowledge 
moved the Office of the Solicitor General from the executive Branch . . . to the Judicial 
Branch.”). 
72 See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing situations in which it has been alleged that the Solicitor 
General has confessed error strategically). 
73 See Rosenzweig, supra note 20, at 2095–2101 (discussing several instances where the 
Solicitor General confessed error out of likely strategic and improper motivation). 
74 Almost every GVR order from a Solicitor General’s confession of error states, “Petition 
for writ of certiorari granted. Judgment vacated, and case remanded . . . for further consideration 
in light of the position asserted by the Solicitor General in his brief for the United States. . . .” 
See, e.g., Nunez v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2290, 2290 (2008). One commentator has asked, 
“[W]hat guidance could anyone find in an order at once so cryptic and so inconclusive?” Arthur 
D. Hellman, ‘Granted, Vacated, and Remanded’—Shedding Light on a Dark Corner of Supreme 
Court Practice, 67 JUDICATURE 389, 391 (1984). 
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the Solicitor General’s brief in opposition to certiorari and the 
government’s appellee brief on remand. But these documents are not 
always consistent with one another and are certainly not as neutral as 
a judicial opinion.
75
 Furthermore, the lower court may not agree with 
the Solicitor General’s confession of error, but feels compelled to 
spend its scarce judicial resources re-evaluating the case merely to 
reassert its original opinion.
76
 Justice Scalia framed this problem 
accurately in his dissenting opinion in Lawrence v. Chater
77
 when he 
said, “In my view we have no power to make such a tutelary remand, 
as to a schoolboy made to do his homework again.”78 
While its problems are significant, GVR’ing the Solicitor 
General’s rationale-confessions-of-error is not without support or 
benefit. First, the Court has interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 2106 as giving the 
Court broad discretion to GVR.
79
 In Lawrence, the companion case to 
Stutson, the Court rejected any limitation on the plain language of that 
statute and interpreted section 2106 simply: to grant the Court “the 
power to remand to a lower federal court any case raising a federal 
issue that is properly before [the Court] in [its] appellate capacity.”80 
Second, the general practice of GVR’ing confessions of error helps 
the Court prune its growing docket. With certiorari petitions 
increasing over the years, the Court must be diligent and efficacious 
in eliminating those cases that are not ready or appropriate for plenary 
review.
81
 Thus, the GVR has become a valuable tool in eliminating 
cases that are not ready for plenary review, yet arguably need some 
further consideration.
82
 
Furthermore, GVR’ing rationale-confessions-of-error assists lower 
courts in observing their judicial duty by “flagging” important issues 
that they either failed to consider or did not have the opportunity to 
                                                                                                                 
75 See, e.g., Stutson v. United States, 516 U.S. 193, 195 (1996) (per curiam) (noting that 
the Solicitor General, in response to the petition for certiorari, reversed the government’s 
original theory of the case); Nunez v. United States, 546 F.3d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting a 
contradiction between the Solicitor General and the United States Attorney in whether a 
confession of error occurred). 
76 Nunez, 546 F.3d at 453 (“We do not think that the judgment is in error. Instead of 
sending readers to our first opinion, we will repeat much of what was said there. Recapitulation 
is better than leaving our reasoning scattered across volumes of the Federal Reporter.”). 
77 516 U.S. 163 (1996) (per curiam). 
78 Id. at 185–86 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
79 See id. at 166 (per curiam) (“Title 28 U.S.C. § 2106 appears on its face to confer upon 
this Court a broad power to GVR . . . .”). 
80 Id. at 166. 
81 Compare The Supreme Court 1995 Term—The Statistics, 110 HARV. L. REV. 367, 371 
tbl.II (1996) (noting that the Court disposed of 6611 cases from its docket), with The Supreme 
Court 2009 Term—The Statistics, 124 HARV. L. REV. 411, 418 tbl.II(A) (2010) (noting that the 
Court disposed of 8,087 cases from its docket). 
82 See generally, Hellman, supra note 74, at 391–92 (discussing the various considerations 
the court makes in GVR’ing a case, particularly focusing on its docket). 
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consider.
83
 Lower courts benefit by having a second chance to ensure 
their precedent is correct. Simultaneously, the Supreme Court benefits 
by avoiding error correction—a task that is not central to its 
purpose.
84
 The Court further profits when it GVR’s cases that raise 
issues upon which the circuit courts are possibly split. As one 
commentator put it, “Justices like the smell of well-percolated 
cases.”85 While it seems strange that the Court might hunt for circuit 
splits by GVR’ing potential splits, rather than allowing the splits to 
occur organically, the Court has explicitly GVR’d a rationale-
confession-of-error for this reason in at least one case.
86
 
Finally, GVR’ing rationale-confessions-of-error promotes equity 
and fairness to the litigants, most obviously the petitioner. Further 
review of a case “in light of” a new position asserted by the Solicitor 
General, or the Solicitor’s suggestion that the lower court missed 
some important analysis, benefits the petitioner because it gives her a 
second chance to prove her theory of the case.
87
 This justification fits 
nicely into the Justice Department’s charge to ensure the “fair and 
impartial administration of justice for all Americans.”88  
II. ANALYZING THE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS AND BENEFITS OF 
GVR’ING RATIONALE-CONFESSIONS-OF-ERROR 
A. Benefits of GVR’ing Rationale-Confessions-of-Error 
1. Relieving the Burden of the Court’s Case Load 
The Court has stated that its general GVR practice helps conserve 
the Court’s limited resources and manage its docket.89 In the 2009 
                                                                                                                 
83 Lawrence, 516 U.S. at 167. 
84 See infra note 106 and accompanying text (noting that the Supreme Court’s role is 
generally not that of error correction). 
85 H. W. PERRY JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 230 (1991). 
86 See Stutson v. United States, 516 U.S. 193, 196 (1996) (per curiam) (“If [the court of 
appeals] continues to conclude that [an intervening precedent] does not apply [to the present 
case], it will be useful for us to have the benefit of its views so that we may resolve the resulting 
conflict between the Circuits.”). 
87 See, e.g., State v. Youngblood, 650 S.E.2d 119, 128–33 (W. Va. 2007) (reconsidering 
defendant’s Brady claim after remand from the Supreme Court; finding for the defendant and 
reversing his sexual assault conviction). 
88 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., FISCAL YEAR 2010 
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT I–1 (Nov. 9, 2010) available at 
http://www.justice.gov/ag/annualreports/pr2010/par2010.pdf. 
89 See Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 167 (1996) (per curiam) (“In an appropriate 
case, a GVR order conserves the scarce resources of this Court that might otherwise be 
expended on plenary consideration. . . and alleviates the ‘[p]otential for unequal treatment’ that 
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term, the most recent year for which statistics are available, the Court 
received 8,159 certiorari petitions.
90
 The Court makes every effort to 
sift and separate those petitions into cases which warrant plenary 
review and those that can either be denied or granted but summarily 
disposed.
91
 Furthermore, the past few decades have seen an increase 
in petitions for certiorari.
92
 Thus, by expanding its GVR practice to 
rationale-confessions-of-error, the Court is able to remove more cases 
from its docket that are not appropriate for full consideration.  
Being effective, however, is far from being appropriate. In his 
dissenting opinion in Mariscal v. United States,
93
 then Associate 
Justice Rehnquist stated: 
With the increasing caseloads of all federal courts, there is a 
natural temptation to “pass the buck” to some other court if 
that is possible. Congress has given [the Court] discretionary 
jurisdiction to deny certiorari if we do not wish to grant 
plenary consideration to a particular case, a benefit that other 
federal courts do not share . . . .
94
  
Thus, Justice Rehnquist’s preference would have been to simply deny 
certiorari in those cases in which the government suggests that a 
lower court’s rationale is incorrect if there is otherwise no reason to 
grant plenary review. Justice Scalia shares this view.
95
 
Yet, even if there is no reason to grant plenary review, the Court 
has stated that there may still be a reason that a case should undergo 
some further inspection by a tribunal in order to correct a possible 
error and satisfy justice. For example, in Lawrence, a new 
interpretation of the Social Security Act adopted by the Social 
                                                                                                                 
 
is inherent in our ability to grant plenary review of all pending cases raising similar issues.”) 
(citations omitted). 
90 JOHN ROBERTS, 2010 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 9 (Dec. 31, 
2010), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year%2Dend/2010year-
endreport.pdf. 
91 See PERRY, supra note 85, at 41–51 (detailing the Court’s process in reviewing 
certiorari petitions and determining whether they should be granted, denied, or handled in some 
other way). 
92 Compare The Supreme Court 1989 Term—The Statistics, 104 HARV. L. REV. 359, 367 
tbl.I (1990) (showing 4,280 petitions for certiorari in 1980), with ROBERTS, supra note 90, at 9 
(stating that the Court received 8,159 certiorari petitions in 2009). 
93 449 U.S. 405 (1981) (per curiam). 
94 Id. at 407 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
95 See Price v. United States, 537 U.S. 1152, 1157–58 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(concluding that because the Court has no grounds on which to vacate the court of appeals’ 
judgment, he would deny the petition for certiorari rather than GVR); Lawrence v. Chater, 516 
U.S. 163, 192 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (concluding that the Court’s GVR was an 
“improper extension[] of [its] limited power to vacate without first finding error below,” and 
that he would instead deny the certiorari petitions for both Lawrence and Stutson). 
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Security Administration with respect to paternity tests could have 
been outcome determinative.
96
 The uncertainty was in fact the 
fundamental reason why the majority, and even Chief Justice 
Rehnquist in dissent,
97
 felt that a GVR was most appropriate.
98
 The 
Court used a “reasonably probable” touchstone in determining 
whether a remand was befitting: GVR’ing is proper where there is a 
“reasonable probability” that a lower court will alter its position if 
given a second opportunity to consider some new development 
announced by the Solicitor General.
99
 Therefore, by implication, 
GVR’ing rationale-confessions-of-error as a way to manage the 
Court’s docket is appropriate only if other good reasons exist to 
remand the case; however, it cannot itself be a good reason.  
In fact, if docket management were the Court’s main concern, it 
would do better to simply deny certiorari. GVR’d cases have 
occasionally returned to the Court for a second time.
100
 Removing 
cases from the Court’s docket today only to hear those cases 
tomorrow is ineffective management. Also, by GVR’ing solely to 
shrink its docket, the Court relieves its own burden at the expense of 
the circuit courts or state courts. In his dissenting opinion in 
Lawrence v. Chater, Justice Scalia took exception to this effect, 
stating that the courts of appeals are neither agents of the Supreme 
Court nor truly “inferior” entities, but are bodies separately 
authorized in the Constitution and created by Congress.
101
 Similarly, 
federalism prohibits the Court from treating state courts as its 
agents.
102
 So, while GVR’ing to lighten the Court’s load may be 
                                                                                                                 
96 Lawrence, 516 U.S. at 174: 
Here . . . our summary review leads us to the conclusion that there is a reasonable 
probability that the Court of Appeals would conclude that the timing of the agency’s 
interpretation does not preclude the deference that it would otherwise receive, and 
that it may be outcome determinative in this case. 
97 See id. at 177 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted): 
I agree with the decision announced in the per curiam to vacate the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in . . . Lawrence v. Chater. Whether or not 
the change of position by the Social Security Administration is ‘cognizable,’ in the 
words of Justice Scalia, it is perfectly reasonable to request the Court of Appeals to 
answer that question in the first instance. 
98 See id. at 172 (per curiam) (“It is precisely because of uncertainty that we GVR.”). 
99 See id. at 167. 
100 See Stutson v. United States, 522 U.S. 1135 (1998) (denying certiorari for two separate 
judgments of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals). 
101 See Lawrence, 516 U.S. at 178–79 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The inferior federal courts 
. . . are not the creatures and agents of this body . . . . Inferior courts are separately authorized in 
the Constitution, created by Acts of Congress, and staffed by judges whose manner of 
appointment and tenure of office are the same as our own . . . .”) (citations omitted). 
102 Id. 
 2/14/2012 4:30:52 PM 
2012] RATIONALE-CONFESSIONS-OF-ERROR 895 
effective, it is greatly problematic. Therefore, expanding the Court’s 
GVR practice to rationale-confessions-of-error must therefore be 
grounded in more fundamental benefits. 
2. Benefiting from a Lower Court’s Full Consideration of Petitioner’s 
Claims 
a. Avoiding Error Correction and Giving Lower Courts a Redo 
In some cases, the Court has claimed that GVR’ing rationale-
confessions-of-error may benefit both the lower courts from which 
the appeals come and the Supreme Court. For example, if a lower 
court fails to adequately address a key issue which may be outcome 
determinative, a Supreme Court’s GVR will benefit the lower court 
by having that particular issue flagged for further consideration.
103
 By 
having an issue reconsidered, the Supreme Court will benefit from the 
wisdom of the lower court before the Court rules on the merits.
104
 As 
part of the Court’s practice in deciding which cases to grant review 
and which to deny, the Justices “often prefer to review reasoned 
opinions that facilitate [their] consideration.”105  
Although the Court’s jurisdiction is generally not one of error 
correction,
106
 where the error may be outcome determinative 
GVR’ing seems a happy middle ground between granting review to 
correct the error and simply denying certiorari.
107
 Thus, the task of 
error correction is relegated to the proper institutions: the courts of 
appeals or the appropriate state courts.
108
 The uncertainty of the effect 
of the error on the outcome seems to be the central factor supporting 
such a GVR. As in Lawrence, if a lower court fails to consider an 
important issue and consideration may in fact change the outcome, 
then superficially, a remand seems quite appropriate. Furthermore, 
because the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction has been limited with regard 
                                                                                                                 
103 Id. at 167 (per curiam). 
104 Id. 
105 Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 872 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
106 See GRESSMAN, supra note 61, at 276 (“It has been reiterated many times that the 
Supreme Court is not primarily concerned with the correction in lower court decisions.”); 
William Howard Taft, The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Under the Act of February 13, 
1925, 35 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1925) (“The function of the Supreme Court is . . . not the remedying of 
a particular litigant’s wrong, but the consideration of cases whose decision involves principles, 
the application of which are of wide public or governmental interest, and which should be 
authoritatively declared by the final court.”). 
107 See Bruhl, supra note 9, at 713 (noting that a GVR is a form of error correction). 
108 See ROBERT A. LEFLAR, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF APPELLATE COURTS 3 
(1976) (“[T]he task to the appellate court is to determine if prejudicial errors were committed at 
the trial level and to correct them if they were.”). 
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to error correction, allowing the courts of appeals or other lower 
courts the first instance to consider the confessed error is in keeping 
with the practices of our judicial system. 
Yet, even where a second consideration by a lower court of a 
previously unconsidered issue may be outcome determinative, serious 
barriers to GVR’ing rationale-confessions-of-error still exist. For 
instance, GVR’ing seems inappropriate where the petitioner never 
raised the unconsidered issue before the lower court or in his or her 
petition for certiorari. Such was the case in Machado v. Holder.
109
 
Machado, an illegal alien, sought reversal of an Immigration Judge’s 
order of removal on the grounds of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.
110
 Solicitor General Elena Kagan conceded that the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit correctly held that the 
Sixth Amendment does not guarantee effective assistance of private 
counsel to an alien in removal proceedings.
111
 However, she 
confessed error that the Fourth Circuit failed to “review the [Board of 
Immigration Appeal’s (“BIA”)] finding” that Machado had not 
established nonconstitutional grounds for ineffective assistance 
relief.
112
 The government recommended that the Court GVR 
Machado’s case to the Fourth Circuit for consideration of whether 
Machado had established grounds for a nonconstitutional remedy and 
whether the BIA’s denial of such remedy was in error.113  
The Court followed the government’s recommendation without 
any opinion,
114
 presumably because it was reasonably probable that 
the outcome of Machado’s appeal would change if the 
nonconstitutional claim were considered, in keeping with Lawrence’s 
“reasonably probably” touchstone. However, Machado never raised 
the BIA’s denial of nonconstitutional relief for review either before 
the Fourth Circuit or the Supreme Court in his petition for 
certiorari.
115
 In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices 
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, argued that petitioner had in fact 
                                                                                                                 
109 130 S. Ct. 1236 (2010). 
110 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Machado v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 1236 (2010) (No. 
08–7721). 
111 See Brief for the Respondent at 12, Machado v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 1236 (2010) (No. 
08–7721) (“[T]he court of appeals also correctly held that there is no constitutional right to 
effective assistance . . . .”). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 12–13. In Matter of Lozada, 19 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), the Board of 
Immigration Appeals created a “framework for an administrative remedy that can give relief for 
ineffective assistance of counsel even though there is no constitutional right.” Id. at 20. 
114 Machado, 130 U.S. at 1236. 
115 See id. at 1236 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[The Court’s GVR] is especially 
inappropriate in this case, as petitioners do not appear to have raised—in the Court of Appeals 
or in their petition for certiorari—the claim that the Government asserts was ignored by the 
Court of Appeals.”) 
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“disclaimed” any nonconstitutional remedy when they asserted that 
the Fourth Circuit’s decision left them remediless against deficient 
immigration practitioners.
116
 Generally, issues not raised in the lower 
courts are not reviewed by the Supreme Court absent extraordinary 
circumstances.
117
 Therefore, there is a strong argument that the Fourth 
Circuit did not err by failing to review the BIA’s denial of Machado’s 
nonconstitutional remedies because it was not asked to do so by 
Machado. Therefore, although the Court did in fact GVR the 
Machado case, it did so anomalously. The Court’s “reasonably 
probable” rule should have yielded to the long-standing forfeiture 
rule. 
Perhaps the Court GVR’d Machado for its own benefit rather than 
the petitioner’s. The Court has, at times, GVR’d cases to benefit from 
a fuller analysis of the pertinent issues before it considers granting 
review. For example, in Youngblood v. West Virginia,
118
 a defendant 
was convicted of two counts of sexual assault, two counts of 
brandishing a firearm, wanton endangerment involving a firearm, and 
indecent exposure.
119
 After conviction, Youngblood moved to set 
aside the verdict, contending that “an investigator working on his case 
had uncovered new and exculpatory evidence, in the form of a 
graphically explicit note that both squarely contradicted the State’s 
account of the incidents and directly supported Youngblood’s 
consensual-sex defense.”120 The note had been shown to a state 
trooper who told the investigator to destroy it.
121
 Youngblood argued 
on appeal that the suppression of this evidence violated West 
Virginia’s federal constitutional obligation to present discovered 
evidence favorable to the defense, and its failure to do so was 
contrary to Brady v. Maryland.
122
 The West Virginia Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
116 Id. Bolstering his dissent, the Chief Justice argued that such an assertion “would make 
no sense if petitioners were advancing both constitutional and nonconstitutional grounds for 
relief on their claim.” Id. 
117 United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788 n.7 (1977).  
118 547 U.S. 867 (2006) (per curiam). Youngblood is not a confession of error case since 
West Virginia never confessed error in the judgment below. Id. at 871–72 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). But, it is part of the Court’s broader GVR practice, and Justice Scalia’s dissent 
parallels his dissent in Lawrence. See id. at 874–75 (arguing that the majority’s decision rested 
on a finding that the state court’s decision was “‘incomplete and unworkmanlike,’—which all 
Members of the Court in Lawrence agreed was an illegitimate basis for a GVR.”) (quoting 
Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 189 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Therefore, the 
Youngblood opinion is very similar to a rationale-confession-of-error case, and may shed some 
light on why the Court may GVR in such cases. 
119 Id. at 868 (per curiam). 
120 Id. at 868. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 868–69 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)). 
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of Appeals affirmed the conviction without fully addressing 
defendant’s constitutional or Brady claim.123 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court GVR’d Youngblood’s case to the 
state court, holding that “[i]f this Court is to reach the merits of this 
case, it would be better to have the benefit of the views of the full 
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia on the Brady issue.”124 
Taking Youngblood as a broad justification, the Court may feel that 
rationale-confessions-of-error warrant remand where an important 
issue was not considered by the lower court but should be considered 
before they grant review. 
Alternatively, the subsequent events of the Youngblood case 
suggest a different interpretation of the Court’s actions. On remand, 
the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed 
Youngblood’s conviction and ordered a new trial, finding that the 
suppressed evidence did in fact violate Brady.
125
 Instead of GVR’ing 
to elicit some possible future benefit, it seems more reasonable that 
the Court plainly disagreed with the state supreme court and subtly 
instructed it to revise its analysis of the Brady issue. In so doing, the 
Court corrected error in the most appropriate fashion: suggesting that 
the lower court correct it.
126
  
Justice Scalia’s observations in dissent bolster this interpretation of 
the Court’s GVR. Justice Scalia stated that he did not understand why 
the Court would benefit from full consideration of the Brady claim by 
the state court majority when the dissenting judges below considered 
Youngblood’s Brady claim in detail and the Court has often reviewed 
lower court opinions that address only one side of an issue.
127
 Justice 
Scalia further stated: 
[T]here is only one obvious sense in which it might be 
“better” to have the West Virginia court revisit the Brady 
issue: If the majority suspects that the court below erred, 
there is a chance that the GVR-in-light-of-nothing will induce 
it to change its mind on remand, sparing us the trouble of 
correcting the suspected error.”128 
                                                                                                                 
123 State v. Youngblood, 618 S.E.2d 544, 557 (W. Va. 2005) (per curiam), cert. granted, 
vacated and remanded, 547 U.S. 867 (2006) (per curiam). 
124 Youngblood, 547 U.S. at 870 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
125 State v. Youngblood, 650 S.E.2d 119, 132–33 (W. Va. 2007). 
126 See Taft, supra note 106, at 10 (discussing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court and review of cases). 
127 See Youngblood, 547 U.S. at 872 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court thus purports to 
conscript the judges of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia to write what is 
essentially an amicus brief on the merits of an issue they have already decided . . . .”). 
128 Id. at 872–73. 
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GVR’ing a rationale-confession-of-error may therefore be a polite 
way for the Court to ask the lower court to “redo” its work because it 
is “reasonably probable” that it got the case wrong in some outcome-
determinative way. We have yet to see how the Fourth Circuit has 
responded to the Court’s GVR in Machado, but one may speculate 
that the Court is GVR’ing rationale-confessions-of-error for this very 
reason.
129
  
b. Hunting for Circuit Splits 
There is also another, less common benefit that accrues to the 
Supreme Court in GVR’ing some rationale-confession-of-error cases. 
GVR’ing rationale-confessions-of-error allows the Court to test 
whether the circuit courts are split on an issue where a petition for 
certiorari presents a possible but unclear split. In general, the Court 
prefers to let important issues and possible circuit splits percolate in 
the courts of appeals before it steps into the discussion.
130
 In cases 
where there is no clear circuit split, the Court may GVR to postpone 
its own role in resolving an important legal question. By GVR’ing in 
this situation, the Court is still taking an active role in prodding and 
testing whether a circuit split actually exists, or may be subtly asking 
a court of appeals to clarify whether it is in fact disagreeing with other 
circuit courts on a particular issue. As one commentator has noted: 
The Supreme Court exists primarily to clarify the law. Once it 
speaks, however, its interpretation is final, so justices want to 
make sure that when they do speak, they can do so as 
intelligently as possible. It is good jurisprudence and makes 
good sense to put off rendering an interpretation as long as 
possible—or more precisely, as long as the benefits of 
avoidance outweigh the problems—so that the Court can 
benefit from analysis by others.
131
 
                                                                                                                 
129 For an example of a court opting to “redo” its work on remand following a GVR, see 
Rosales v. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 426 F.3d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 2005) 
(per curiam) (citation omitted): 
The Supreme Court vacated the opinion after the government conceded in its brief to the 
Court that Rosales should be considered “in custody” according to the prevailing view in our 
sister circuits. Reconsidering the case in light of the government’s concession, we join the 
Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits and hold that an alien who is subject to a final order of 
deportation . . . is “in custody” under [28 U.S.C.] § 2241. 
130 See PERRY, supra note 85, at 230–31 (noting that “Justices like the smell of well-
percolated cases. . .”). 
131 Id. 
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Furthermore, one unnamed Justice succinctly described the 
importance of percolation in the context of possible circuit splits:  
If . . . [a court of appeals] has a ruling that seems to create a 
conflict, we will let it percolate to see if the conflict will work 
itself out. Conflicts often work themselves out . . . . But we 
are better informed if the issue has been considered by 
several courts of appeals.
132
  
The Supreme Court applied this justification in Stutson v. United 
States.
133
 Stutson was convicted for cocaine possession by the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
134
 His 
lawyer filed a notice of appeal one day late and with the court of 
appeals rather than the district court.
135
 The district court 
subsequently denied Stutson’s appeal, reasoning that his lawyer’s 
error was not “‘excusable neglect’ within the meaning of Rule 4(b) of 
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure . . . .”136 One day before 
Stutson’s notice of appeal was due, the Supreme Court handed down 
its decision in Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick 
Associates Limited Partnership,
137
 which held that, under the 
bankruptcy rules, “excusable neglect” may encompass an attorney’s 
inadvertent failure to timely file a notice of appeal.
138
 But, without 
mentioning Pioneer, The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit summarily affirmed the district court’s decision.139  
Therefore, on certiorari, the Court did not know whether the court 
of appeals had applied Pioneer. Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit’s 
affirmance ran counter to the “unanimous view of the six Courts of 
Appeals that . . . ha[d] expressly addressed this new and important 
issue, and . . . held that the Pioneer standard applie[d] in Rule 4 
cases.”140 The Solicitor General confessed error, repudiating the 
government’s earlier position before the Eleventh Circuit and 
agreeing with the six circuits that applied Pioneer to Rule 4 cases.
141
 
The Supreme Court GVR’d, in part, explicitly to see whether the 
Eleventh Circuit was in fact splitting from the other circuits and 
                                                                                                                 
132 Id. at 233. 
133 516 U.S. 193 (1996). 
134 Id. at 194. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 507 U.S. 380 (1993). 
138 Id. at 387–97. 
139 Stutson, 516 U.S. at 194–95. 
140 Id. at 195. 
141 Id. 
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holding that Pioneer did not apply.
142
 Thus, Stutson demonstrates the 
Court’s use of GVR in rationale-confession-of-error cases to explore 
possible circuit splits. 
3. As a Matter of Fairness to the Petitioner 
Finally, the Court’s GVR practice in rationale-confessions-of-error 
serves as a tool of equity or fairness to the litigants, most particularly 
the petitioner.
143
 In some cases, the Court may believe that a second 
consideration of a case or issue by the lower court in light of the 
Solicitor General’s confession may change the case’s outcome. In 
these situations, the Court may believe that a GVR would be the 
fairest disposition for the case. For example, in Lawrence, the Social 
Security Administration (“Administration”) reinterpreted the Social 
Security Act to require courts to determine the constitutionality of 
applicable state intestacy laws before applying those laws in 
determining entitlement to benefits under the federal statutory 
scheme.
144
 The Administration also stated that the government would 
be applying that new interpretation in future cases.
145
 The Supreme 
Court held that treating Lawrence like other future beneficiaries of the 
new interpretation “further[ed] fairness.”146  
However, the Lawrence court hinted at other considerations that 
the Court must make before claiming that fairness can support a 
GVR. First, the Court must consider whether a GVR would be fair to 
the government as respondent. Second, the Court must consider 
whether the government’s confession of error is “the product of unfair 
or manipulative Government litigating strategies.”147 
GVR’ing a case where a consideration of the Solicitor General’s 
confessed error may be outcome determinative is obviously fair to the 
petitioner. However, such action may not be fair to the government. 
In Lawrence, the Court concluded that a GVR would be fair to the 
                                                                                                                 
142 See id. at 196 (“If it continues to conclude that Pioneer does not apply, it will be useful 
for us to have the benefit of its views so that we may resolve the resulting conflict between the 
Circuits.”).  
143 See Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 167 (1996) (per curiam) (citing United States v. 
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 556 n.16 (1982) (asserting that a GVR order, in appropriate cases, 
removes the “‘[p]otential for unequal treatment’ that is inherent in [the Court’s] inability to 
grant plenary review of all pending cases raising similar issues”). 
144 See id. at 165 (discussing the Social Security Act’s requirement that, in cases where a 
dependent claims entitlement to a decedent’s Social Security benefits, the reviewing court 
determine paternity according to state law). 
145 Id. at 175 
146 Id.; see also Hellman, supra note 74, at 398 (stating that to treat one litigant differently 
than other litigants in similar cases “solely by reason of an accident of timing” would be 
“inconsistent with the obligation . . . to do justice in the case before [the Court]”). 
147 Lawrence, 516 U.S. at 174–75. 
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government because “[t]hat disposition [had] the Government’s 
express support . . . .”148 Therefore, the case where fairness is most 
easily used to justify a rationale-confession-of-error-GVR is where 
the Solicitor General recommends a GVR in light of his confession.  
There are, however, many cases where the Solicitor General 
confesses error in the lower court’s rationale, but does not think 
reconsideration by the lower court is necessary and therefore does not 
suggest a GVR.
149
 While the Solicitor General certainly cannot 
control how the Court responds to his position in any case, the Court 
may take the Solicitor General by surprise and GVR where the 
Solicitor General does not confess error in the judgment, but only the 
rationale, and does not suggest a GVR.
150
 A GVR may be unfair to 
the government, therefore, where the government confessed error due 
to its special candor with the Court, and not because it believed the 
case should be remanded.
151
 The Solicitor General may not feel 
personally slighted. Still, because his confession was likely motivated 
primarily out of honesty, and it resulted in an outcome creating more 
work for the government attorneys trying the case in the courts below, 
he may feel that the Court dealt with his honesty unfairly and created 
tension between his office and the office of the United States 
Attorney.
152
 Such a disposition could have a chilling effect on the 
special candor that exists between the Solicitor General and the Court. 
One commentator rightly pointed out that “the Court must not abuse 
the Solicitor General’s candor in bringing errors to its attention, for 
the Solicitor General might respond by submitting less candid briefs, 
to the detriment of both institutions.”153 
                                                                                                                 
148 Id. at 174. 
149 See, e.g., Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 4–5, Rosales v. Bureau of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 545 U.S. 1101 (2005) (No. 04–8465), 2005 WL 
1330298 at *4–*5 (arguing that although the district court erred in finding that petitioner was 
not “in custody” for jurisdictional purposes in his habeas corpus petition, certiorari should be 
denied because petitioner could not prove his underlying habeas claim and the circuit court’s 
opinion was not binding precedent).  
150 See Bruhl, supra note 9, at 734 (emphasis in original) (“Given that the Court can GVR 
even when the Solicitor General, in the course of opposing a grant of certiorari, admits that there 
was some mistake in (only) the rationale below, the Solicitor General might sometimes be 
surprised indeed to learn that, against his will, he ‘confessed’ error.”); see also Price v. United 
States, 537 U.S. 1152, 1156–57 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court GVR’d 
even though the government insisted judgment was correct). 
151 See, e.g., Alvarado v. United States, 497 U.S. 543, 544–45 (1990) (per curiam) 
(GVR’ing despite the Solicitor General’s argument that the Second Circuit’s error was 
harmless); Rosenzweig, supra note 20, at 2101 (noting that several members of the Court have 
admonished that GVR’ing in situations where the Solicitor has argued that the confessed errors 
are harmless risks cooling the relationship between the Solicitor General and the Court). 
152 See Cox, supra note 24, at 225 (stating that the United States Attorney may feel that 
“the rug [was] pulled out from under him”). 
153 Rosenzweig, supra note 20, at 2082. 
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Furthermore, as a matter of common sense, if the Court does not 
believe that the rationale below will likely change in light of the 
government’s new position, then it clearly would not be “fair” to the 
petitioner to have the lower court reanalyze an inconsequential 
argument. In fact, it would generally be unfair to all involved. The 
lower court would have to spend its similarly scarce resources 
analyzing an issue that is ultimately not outcome determinative, and 
both litigants would have to spend time, effort, and money submitting 
briefs and arguing their positions a second time before the lower 
court. 
B. Problems with GVR’ing Rationale-Confessions-of-Error 
1. Actual Error? 
Significantly, the first problem with GVR’ing a rationale-
confession-of-error is that there may be no error at all. In Mariscal, 
then Associate Justice Rehnquist advised that the best interest of the 
Court was not served by deferring to the Solicitor General’s 
“suggestion that a Court of Appeals may have been in error after 
another representative of the executive branch and the Justice 
Department has persuaded the Court of Appeals to reach the result 
which it did.”154 That an error is suggested led the Court in Young v. 
United States
155
 to require independent review of the merits of such 
suggestion rather than simply defer to the government attorney.
156
  
Justice Scalia agreed with Justice Rehnquist’s admonition in Price 
v. United States.
157
 In Price, a grand jury indicted James Price for 
possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute and carrying a 
firearm in relation to a drug-trafficking crime.
158
 Price was 
subsequently convicted for the lesser-included offense of simple 
possession of cocaine base, but also convicted on the firearm charge, 
and sentenced to 123 months in prison.
159
 This sentence was longer 
than normal under the sentencing guidelines because the court used 
Price’s misdemeanor conviction as a predicate offense for the firearm 
conviction, under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(a)-(2).
160
 Price appealed his 
                                                                                                                 
154 Mariscal v. United States, 449 U.S. 405, 406–07 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
155 315 U.S. 257 (1942).  
156 Id. at 258–59. 
157 537 U.S. 1152, 1152–53 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
158 Brief for the United States of America at 2, United States v. Price, 31 F. App’x 158 (5th 
Cir. 2003) (No. 00–51078). 
159 Id. at 3. 
160 See United States v. Price, No. 00–51078, 2003 WL 25558524, at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 23, 
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sentence, claiming that his trial and appellate counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to challenge his 
sentence.
161
  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that 
Price’s claim concerning his simple possession sentence was 
meritorious, but his claim concerning his firearm sentence was not.
162
 
Price subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of 
certiorari.
163
 The Solicitor General asserted that the federal prosecutor 
erred by failing to notify the trial court and Price that the government 
would seek a longer sentence using Price’s simple possession 
conviction as a predicate for the firearm conviction.
164
 The Solicitor 
General interpreted the sentencing statute to imply that a predicate 
offense supporting a longer sentence on a firearm conviction must be 
a felony, and Price’s predicate offense was merely a misdemeanor.165  
The Court, in a per curiam opinion, followed the government’s 
characterization of the case and GVR’d the Fifth Circuit’s denial of 
habeas relief.
166
 In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that despite the 
Solicitor General’s arguments to the contrary in his brief, the Fifth 
Circuit’s judgment was “quite obviously correct.”167 Scalia pointed 
out that simple possession of more than five grams of cocaine is a 
felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) and 21 U.S.C. § 844(a).
168
 And 
because Price stipulated that the police seized 6.7 grams of cocaine 
from him, he could subsequently be convicted of a “drug trafficking 
crime” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) and 18 U.S.C. 801.169 Therefore, 
Price’s conviction was not in error, and the Court had no grounds to 
vacate a judgment that is not in error.
170
 
                                                                                                                 
 
2003) (per curiam) (holding that acquittal of the predicate offense does not preclude conviction 
under § 924(c)(1)). Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), a defendant convicted for a “drug trafficking 
crime” who also uses or carries a firearm during the crime should be sentenced to no less than 
five years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006). 
161 Brief for the United States of America at 3, United States v. Price, 31 F. App’x 158 (5th 
Cir. 2003) (No. 00–51078). 
162 Price, 2003 WL 25558524 at *1. 
163 Id. 
164 See Price v. United States, 537 U.S. 1152, 1156 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(discussing petitioner’s argument that “the maximum punishment for his . . . offense was one 
year because the Government did not file a notice . . . that it would seek to rely on petitioner’s 
prior drug convictions to obtain an increased punishment”).  
165 See id. at 1156–57 (noting petitioner’s claim that his prior conviction was only a 
misdemeanor and could not be used to support his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). 
166 Id. at 1152 (per curiam). 
167 Id. at 1153 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
168 Id. at 1157. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 1153 (arguing that the Court has “no power to vacate a judgment that has not been 
shown to be (or been conceded to be) in error”) (emphasis omitted). 
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The failure to identify an actual error displays the weakness of the 
Court’s “reasonable probability” test for GVR’ing rationale-
confessions-of-error. While it makes sense to remand a case in which 
the Solicitor General confesses error in the judgment under the 
rationale that it is “reasonably probable” that the Solicitor General is 
correct and the case’s outcome will change on remand, determining 
the “reasonable probability” of a changed outcome in a rationale-
confession-of-error seems much more speculative. In Price, the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed its original judgment on remand in a short, 
unpublished opinion that essentially agreed with Justice Scalia that its 
original judgment was correct.
171
 Had the Court given greater review, 
it would likely have come to the same conclusion because the correct 
analysis was quite clear.
172
  
Alternatively, had the Court shown less deference to the Solicitor 
General and denied certiorari in the absence of a conceded error in the 
judgment, much wasted time and resources could have been avoided. 
If the Court in fact understood the case to present a more complex 
solution than what both Justice Scalia and the Fifth Circuit thought, 
then granting plenary review would have been the more appropriate 
disposition. That the Court finally denied certiorari after the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed its original judgment and analysis on remand 
suggests that the case did not present such a complex legal 
question.
173
 
2. Encouraging Manipulative and Strategic Litigation Practices by 
the Government 
The Court’s practice in GVR’ing rationale-confessions-of-error 
risks encouraging the government to act manipulatively when coming 
before it. When Simon Sobeloff was Chief Judge of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, he once said, “[w]hen I was 
                                                                                                                 
171 United States v. Price, No. 00–51078, 2003 WL 25558524, at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 23, 
2003) (per curiam). petition for cert. denied (U.S. Oct. 14, 2003) (No. 00–51078).  
172 I am assuming that the Court did not independently review the merits of the Solicitor 
General’s confession of error in Price because of the language that it used in its opinion 
remanding the case compared to language used in the past when it has taken independent 
review. Compare Price, 537 U.S. at 1152 (“[C]ase remanded for further consideration in light of 
United States v. LaBonte and the Solicitor General’s acknowledgment that the Court of Appeals 
erred in concluding that petitioner’s drug possession offense qualified as a predicate felony 
. . . .”) (internal quotations and citation omitted), with Levine v. United States, 383 U.S. 265, 
266–67 (1966) (per curiam) (“On the basis of [the Solicitor General’s] concession, and upon 
consideration of the entire record, we vacate the judgment . . . [and] remand the case . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
173 See PERRY, supra note 85, at 253 (detailing the multifarious criteria that a case must 
meet in order to warrant plenary review and noting that issue-importance is one of the first 
criteria that must be met). 
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Solicitor General . . . I thought that confessing error was the noblest 
function of the office. Now that I am a Circuit Judge, I know it is the 
lowest trick one lawyer can play upon another.”174  
The Solicitor General’s close relationship with the Court can 
obscure the boundary between the Solicitor General’s role as an 
advocate before the Court and a de facto justice.
175
 As mentioned 
above, the Court has relied heavily, over the years, on the Solicitor 
General’s role as a “‘traffic cop,’ acting to control the flow of cases to 
the Court.”176 This reliance has granted the Solicitor General 
significant power to shape the development of the law.
177
 Because the 
Court is more likely to remand when the Solicitor confesses error, he 
may confess error merely to avoid a ruling adverse to the 
government’s interests.178 Moreover, GVR’ing rationale-confessions-
of-error gives the Solicitor the greatest opportunity to confess error 
strategically because he does not need to prove that the error was 
controlling, but merely that it existed.
179
 This is essentially a blank 
check, which the Solicitor General can use to steer the law according 
to his own whim, or, perhaps, the executive’s. 
The claim that the government may confess error manipulatively 
is, in most cases, only speculative. The Solicitor General’s motive 
                                                                                                                 
174 Cox, supra note 24, at 225. 
175 See CAPLAN, supra note 28, at 6: 
By screening cases that they believe are not ready for hearing by the Courts of 
Appeals or the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General and his aides help assure that 
judges rule on those the SG . . . consider[s] ripe for appeal. The SG’s influence at the 
Supreme Court is even more striking than his authority within the Executive Branch. 
He does not sit beside the Justices on the bench, but he stands in place of them when 
he decides which cases should be taken to the Court. 
176 Id. (quoting Justice Stewart). 
177 See Casey v. United States, 343 U.S. 808, 812 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating 
that the Solicitor General may confess error “to save one case at the expense of another”); 
Rosenzweig, supra note 20, at 2111 (“The need to consider and advance such long-term 
interests may lead the Solicitor General to confess error, even at the cost of sacrificing a victory 
in a particular case, in order to avoid an adverse ruling with potentially far-reaching effects.”). 
178 Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 187 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that 
because the government is the Court’s most frequent litigant, “we can expect the Government to 
take full advantage of the opportunity to wash out, on certiorari, disadvantageous positions it 
has embraced below; and we can expect it to focus less of its energy upon getting its position 
‘right’ in the courts of appeals”). An example of the government failing to “focus its energy 
upon getting its position right” in the courts below can be seen in Knox v. United States, 510 
U.S. 939 (1993). In a 2001 article written for THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND 
PROCESS, former Solicitor General Drew Days, III disclosed that the prosecutor trying the Knox 
case in the district court intentionally left out highly incriminating evidence of hard-core child 
pornography because the prosecutor wanted Knox to be “a test case” for the limits of the federal 
child-pornography laws. Days, supra note 50, at 515. 
179 See, e.g., Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 4–5, Rosales v. Bureau of 
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 545 U.S. 1101 (2005) (No. 04–8465), 2005 WL 1330298 
at *4–*5 (failing to show that a controlling error existed).  
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behind confessing error in any particular case is not easily 
discerned.
180
 However, there is at least one example of the Solicitor 
General using a rationale-confessing-of-error strategically. In Knox v. 
United States,
181
 Solicitor General Drew Days confessed error in a 
case reviewing the scope of a federal child-pornography statute.
182
 
The statute prohibited knowingly receiving through the mail 
depictions of minors engaged in “sexually explicit conduct,”183 which 
was further defined as any “lascivious exhibition of the genitals or 
pubic area.”184 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit held that up-close depictions of underage girls’ pubic areas 
covered by underwear, bikinis, and leotards fell within the statute’s 
definition of sexually explicit conduct.
185
  
Fearing that the Third Circuit’s expansive construction of the 
statute might render the statute unconstitutionally overbroad, and 
concerned that an adverse response by the Court might “jeopardize 
later child-pornography prosecutions,” Solicitor Days felt “that it was 
important to get the Knox case out of the Supreme Court as quickly as 
possible.”186 Days therefore confessed error in the Third Circuit’s 
rationale, arguing that a construction of the statute different than the 
Third Circuit’s construction should control, and, without stating that 
his construction would change the case’s outcome, asked the Court to 
remand.
187
 The Supreme Court granted Days’ request without 
                                                                                                                 
180 Casey, 343 U.S. at 809 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also id. at 811–12: 
A confession of error . . . may disclose an intervening decision on a question of law 
that undermines the lower court’s conclusion; it may disclose perjury by an 
important witness or newly discovered evidence; it may disclose other factors which 
weaken the conclusion of the lower court. Or it may disclose a maneuver to save one 
case at the expense of another. 
181 510 U.S. 939 (1993). 
182 United States v. Knox, 977 F.2d 815, 817 (3rd Cir. 1992), cert. granted, vacated and 
remanded 510 U.S. 939 (1993) (analyzing the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1994), a child 
pornography statute). 
183 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)(A) (1994). 
184 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(E) (1994). 
185 Knox, 977 F.2d at 817, 825. 
186 Days, supra note 50, at 515. 
187 Brief for the United States at 9–10, Knox v. United States, 510 U.S. 939 (1993), (No. 
92–1183), 1993 WL 723366 at *9–*10. Solicitor Days’ narrower construction of 18 U.S.C. § 
2256(2)(E) required an exhibition of a minor’s genitals or pubic area to contain two elements 
before it was prohibited as “lascivious”: (1) that the material include a visual depiction of the 
genital area, as opposed to depictions of the clothing covering those areas, and (2) that the 
material depict a minor “lasciviously engaging in sexual conduct” rather than lascivious conduct 
by the photographer, producer, or consumer of the material. Id. at 9. This construction of the 
statute was quickly rejected by the Senate in a unanimous resolution following the Court’s 
remand of the Knox case, which was ultimately joined by the House in a separate resolution. 
Days, supra note 50, at 516. 
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reviewing the statute or its legislative history.
188
 Days’ maneuver was 
therefore successful, and the Court never addressed Knox’s novel 
question.
189
 
By taking a “longer view” of the law, and confessing error in the 
rationale of the Third Circuit’s decision, Solicitor Days was able to 
control the future of the child-pornography statute in question.
190
 The 
Court GVR’d despite the absence of any argument that the Third 
Circuit’s strained interpretation of the statute led to an incorrect 
outcome. And, on remand, the Third Circuit affirmed its earlier 
decision, essentially concluding that under either Days’ construction 
or its own, Knox could not escape conviction.
191
 
As Knox shows, confessing error in a lower court’s rationale 
without asserting that it was outcome determinative gives the 
Solicitor a great opportunity to control the evolution of the law. If 
Justice Scalia’s prediction in Stutson proves true—that mechanically 
GVR’ing confessions of error will encourage the government to 
“wash out, on certiorari, disadvantageous positions it has embraced 
below”192—then we can expect future manipulation by the Solicitor 
General. The adverse effect of the government’s efforts to manipulate 
the development of the law in the Supreme Court is also shown in the 
impact GVR’ing rationale-confession-of-error has on lower courts. 
3. Negative Impact on the Lower Courts 
GVR’ing rationale-confessions-of-error treats unfairly lower 
courts that allegedly made the error. As Judge Learned Hand said, “It 
is bad enough to have the Supreme Court reverse you, but I will be 
damned if I will be reversed by some Solicitor General.”193 Judge 
Hand’s comment goes to several frustrations that the lower courts 
experience in being reversed and asked to reconsider their original 
                                                                                                                 
188 See Knox v. United States, 510 U.S. 939 (1993) (GVR’ing the case without further 
explanation). 
189 On remand, the Third Circuit affirmed its earlier decision unspectacularly, holding that 
under either its or the Solicitor’s construction of the statute, Knox’s conviction could stand. 
United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 754 (3rd Cir. 1994). The Supreme Court denied Knox’s 
second petition for certiorari. Knox v. United States, 513 U.S. 1109 (1995). 
190 See Rosenzweig, supra note 20, at 2111 (describing the reasoning behind the 
government’s tendency to take “a longer view” than other private litigants as being based in the 
fact that “a ruling in one case will often affect numerous other pending and future Government 
cases”). 
191 Knox, 32 F.3d at 754. See also, Days, supra note 50, at 516 (stating that the Third 
Circuit affirmed Knox’s conviction on remand “irrespective of whether its reading of the statute 
or [Days’] controlled”). 
192 Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 187 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
193 Cox, supra note 24, at 224–25 (quoting Judge Learned Hand). 
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decision based exclusively on a suggested error by the Solicitor 
General.
194
  
There may be confusion as to what the Supreme Court is asking 
lower courts to do. Rarely has the Court given any statement as to 
why they are GVR’ing in light of a confession of error, but instead 
robotically state, “The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded 
. . . for further consideration in light of the position asserted by the 
Solicitor General . . . .”195 Some have asked whether this disposition 
is a “polite form of reversal,” inviting the lower court to reverse itself 
and save itself the embarrassment of future reversal.
196
 However, 
many lower courts have felt free to affirm their earlier decision.
197
  
Perhaps the more complicated problem is not in discerning what 
the Supreme Court is asking the lower court to do, but in determining 
what the lower court should look to for guidance in reevaluating a 
remanded case. At first, it seems obvious that the court should look to 
the Solicitor General’s brief, since that is where the “position 
asserted” lies. But, in several cases the government, after remand, has 
not followed the Solicitor’s theory of the case, but has instead 
asserted a third theory of the case. In Knox, for example, after the 
Supreme Court remanded the case in light of the Solicitor General’s 
confession of error, the government retreated from the Solicitor’s 
interpretation of the child-pornography statute in question and 
proposed an interpretation that was a compromise between the Third 
Circuit’s earlier position and the Solicitor’s position.198  
                                                                                                                 
194 See Mariscal v. United States, 449 U.S. 405, 406 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(questioning whether the “Court should mechanically accept any suggestion from the Solicitor 
General” that an error has occurred in a lower court). 
195 Machado v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 1236, 1236 (2010). 
196 See Hellman, supra note 74, at 392 (suggesting that a GVR is a reversal changed in 
form but not in substance). 
197 See, e.g., Nunez v. United States, 546 F.3d 450, 453 (7th Cir. 2008) (“We do not think 
that the judgment is in error. Instead of sending readers to our first opinion, we will repeat much 
of what was said there. Recapitulation is better than leaving our reasoning scattered across 
volumes of the Federal Reporter.”); United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 747, 754 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(rejecting the government’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)(A) and reaffirming its 
original position that a “‘lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area . . . encompasses 
visual depictions of a child's genitals or pubic area even when these areas are covered by an 
article of clothing and are not discernible.”). 
198 See Knox, 32 F.3d at 746: 
In its brief after remand, the government recedes somewhat from the view implied 
by its Supreme Court brief that the depiction must show the child subject to have 
some lascivious intent. The government now argues only that the material must 
depict some conduct by the child subject, which includes a “lascivious exhibition of 
the genitals or pubic area,” and which appeals to the lascivious interest of some 
potential audience. 
 2/14/2012 4:30:52 PM 
910 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:3 
Similarly, in Nunez v. United States,
199
 the Solicitor General 
suggested that the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit erred in construing petitioner’s waiver of appeal and collateral 
review.
200
 Armando Nunez was charged with several federal narcotics 
charges and subsequently entered into a plea agreement.
201
 As part of 
the agreement, Nunez waived his right to appeal or collaterally attack 
his sentence.
202
 Yet, after receiving a 160 month sentence, Nunez 
asked his lawyer to file an appeal.
203
 After his attorney refused, Nunez 
filed a collateral attack, arguing that his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance.
204
 Both the district court and the court of appeals denied 
Nunez relief, “finding that petitioner had waived his right to raise 
even the ineffective-assistance claim on collateral review.”205  
Nunez filed a petition for certiorari, and the Solicitor General 
argued that the Seventh Circuit erred by denying petitioner relief 
upon petitioner’s collateral-review waiver.206 The Supreme Court 
agreed and GVR’d.207 Yet, when the case came before the Seventh 
Circuit on remand, the government took still another position and 
“made the confession of error that the Solicitor General did not”: that 
the collateral waiver did not bar an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim.
208
 The Seventh Circuit interpreted this new position as the 
government giving up its right to be protected from appeal following 
the plea agreement. Because of this change in position, the Seventh 
Circuit stated that it “would be inclined to conclude a second time 
that the waiver covers the conviction—but its scope no longer 
matters. For the United States, as the waiver’s beneficiary, may freely 
give up its protection. And it has done so.”209 Therefore, in 
circumstances similar to Knox and Nunez, what the lower court is 
ultimately required to reevaluate is different from what the Supreme 
Court asked it to reevaluate. The lower court may feel as though it is 
being manipulated by the government and that the Court is condoning 
the government’s turnabout litigation tactics,210 affirming Simon 
                                                                                                                 
199 128 S. Ct. 2990 (2008). 
200 Brief for the United States at 9, Nunez v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2990 (2008) (No. 
07–818), 2008 WL 2050805 at *9. 
201 Nunez v. United States, 495 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2007). 
202 Id. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
205 Nunez v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 2990, 2990 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
206 Id. 
207 Id. (per curiam). 
208 Nunez v. United States 546 F.3d 450, 451–52 (7th. Cir. 2008). 
209 Id. at 452. 
210 See Cox, supra note 24, at 225 (describing how a confession of error may lead the judge 
below to feel that the government has led her astray). 
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Sobeloff’s remark that confession of error “is the lowest trick one 
lawyer can play upon another.”211  
Furthermore, Judge Hand’s comment quoted above also highlights 
that the Court’s mechanical acquiescence puts the power to control a 
case in the hands of the government.
212
 The Court in Young held that 
the “public interest that a result be reached which promotes a well-
ordered society is foremost . . . and the proper administration of the 
. . . law cannot be left merely to the stipulation of parties.”213 While 
neither the Supreme Court nor any lower court is completely handing 
their power to render decisions over to the government, mechanically 
rendering GVRs provides a significant opportunity for the 
government to control the development of the law. In some sense, 
therefore, the Court is abdicating its duty “to say what the law is.”214 
This problem is significant because, under the Constitution, the 
legislature and the judiciary, and not the executive, are empowered to 
create and develop the law.
215
 Giving the executive branch the ability 
to develop law presents a substantial conflict among the co-equal 
branches of government.
216
 A principal function of dividing 
governmental powers among three branches is to “protect individual 
liberties from government intrusion.”217 Where the executive branch 
is given power to shape the law, it is inclined to shape the law in its 
favor.
218
 Furthermore, because private litigants are in court less 
frequently, they do not have the same opportunity to shape the law in 
the same way that the government does.
219
 Therefore, government 
                                                                                                                 
211 Id. 
212 See id. (quoting Murray Seasongood, a former Harvard law professor, as saying about 
defense lawyers, “You are not there to decide the case; the judge is to decide it. The system 
works best when each fellow performs his function and contributes to the result instead of trying 
to play God.”). 
213 Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 259 (1942); see also Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 
846, 867 (1985) (“[T]he proper interpretation of an important federal statute and regulation[] . . . 
cannot be left merely to the stipulation of parties.”); U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall 
P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 29 (1994) (holding that vacatur of a judgment under review cannot be 
justified by a mere agreement among the parties). 
214 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). See Hessick, supra note 29, at 
483–84 (arguing that the government uses confession of error to shape the development of the 
law by “steer[ing] an appellate court away from adopting an overly broad rule” that would 
injure future government litigation “and instead to issue a ruling based on narrow grounds”). 
215 See id. at 491 (“[T]he creation and development of law are functions performed by the 
legislature and courts . . . . ”). 
216 See id. (“[I]t is one of the basic principles of our government that the Executive should 
not perform legislative or judicial functions.”). 
217 Id. 
218 See id. (arguing that “[a]llowing the [executive branch] to shape the criminal law poses 
a risk that the law will develop in ways that are less protective of defendants’ rights and more 
likely to result in the imposition of criminal penalties”). 
219 See id. (noting that private defendants “do not have the same opportunities or incentives 
[as the government] to use appellate strategies to develop the law in defendant-friendly ways”). 
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attorneys and private litigants are on unequal footing in shaping the 
direction of the law inside the courtroom.
220
 The Supreme Court’s 
automatic GVR whenever the Solicitor General confesses error in a 
lower court’s rationale only advances this unequal footing. 
III. A PROPOSAL: DENYING CERTIORARI INSTEAD OF GVR’ING 
WOULD SOLVE THE PROBLEMS WITHOUT ERODING THE BENEFITS. 
Any solution to the problems created by the Solicitor General’s 
rationale-confession-of-error must come by the Court’s initiative. 
New statutes regulating the Solicitor General would likely undercut 
the flexibility and independence that is essential to the Solicitor 
General’s office. As an extreme example, if a new statute prohibited 
confessions of error in general, the Court would suffer the most. The 
Court would be required to add to its already heavy workload the task 
of reviewing lower court decisions for error, a task that the Judiciary 
Act of 1925 essentially removed from the Court’s responsibilities to 
free up its docket.
221
 The public would also suffer because such a 
statute would essentially abrogate the Solicitor General’s duty to seek 
fair and impartial justice and uphold the public’s interest in those 
cases where a genuine, outcome-determinative error exists, or is 
reasonably believed to exist.  
A more nuanced statute prohibiting all rationale-confessions-of-
error would have the same effect. As described above, not every error 
is definitively outcome determinative or definitively harmless. 
Sometimes a genuine error occurs and the question that both the 
government and the Court must decide is whether that error may have 
affected the outcome. 
An equally unworkable solution would be for the Court to return to 
its practice set out in Young: independently examining the Solicitor 
General’s confessed errors. First, that the Court has not followed this 
standard in the past fifty years suggests its infeasibility. Second, the 
number of certiorari petitions has only increased since Young, and the 
Court has reacted by significantly changing the way it reviews 
petitions.
222
 To ask the Court to return to a standard that was 
                                                                                                                 
220 See id. (concluding that “[a]ppellate strategy . . . is an unequal tool that may tend to 
push the criminal law in the government’s favor . . . ”). 
221 See GRESSMAN, supra note 61, at 235 (describing the effect on the Court of the 
Judiciary Act of 1925, which reduced the Court’s mandatory docket and gave the Court much 
more discretion through the certiorari process). 
222 See PERRY, supra note 85, at 41–51 (describing the current process the Court goes 
through in vetting certiorari petitions, which was initiated by Chief Justice Burger in response to 
the increase in petitions).  
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established in a different time and under different circumstances 
would be fruitless. 
Therefore, this Note proposes that the most pragmatic solution to 
the imbalance discussed above would be for the Court to simply deny 
certiorari where the Solicitor General cannot point to an outcome-
determinative error of law in the court below.
223
 In other words, 
Justice Scalia is correct that the Court should not GVR a case in 
which the Solicitor General confesses error unless the error is in the 
judgment.
224
 Denying certiorari absent an error in the judgment would 
reduce the abuses that are present in the Court’s current GVR 
practice, yet maintain many of its benefits. 
As stated above,
 225
 if docket management is the Court’s main 
concern, denying certiorari is a more direct solution because there is 
always a chance that the Court may see the same case in its certiorari 
pool again after it GVR’s.226 Moreover, if the Solicitor General 
understands that the Court is likely to deny certiorari unless he asserts 
a controlling error of law in the opinion below, the Solicitor will be 
much more definitive in confessing error. Therefore, cases like 
Lawrence and Stutson may still receive GVRs because in both cases a 
new and intervening legal standard raised doubts about the propriety 
of the decision below.
227
 
Furthermore, any benefit that the lower court receives from 
“flagging a particular issue that it does not appear to have fully 
considered,”228 is significantly outweighed by the detriments to the 
lower court from the government’s turnabout litigation tactics, and 
                                                                                                                 
223 I do not intend to advocate the abolition of the other circumstances, outside of 
confession of error, where a GVR may be appropriate. See Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 
179–83 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the various circumstances under which the 
Court has traditionally GVR’d); Bruhl, supra note 9, at 717–24 (analyzing the methods and 
frequency of the Court’s GVR practice). 
224 See Lawrence, 516 U.S. at 191–92 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Henceforth, I shall vote for 
an order granting certiorari, vacating the judgment below without determination of the merits, 
and remanding for further consideration, only . . . where the respondent or appellee confesses 
error in the judgment below.”). 
225 See supra Part II.A.1 (analyzing the argument that GVR practice helps to manage the 
Supreme Court’s docket). 
226 See, e.g., Stutson v. United States, 522 U.S. 1135 (1998) (denying certiorari); Knox v. 
United States, 513 U.S. 1109 (1995) (denying certiorari). See also Bruhl, supra note 9, at 715 
(“Each GVR represents a decision to devote a slice of the Court’s limited capacity to attempting 
to do justice in an individual case . . . .”). 
227 In Lawrence, a new interpretation of the Social Security Act by the Social Security 
Administration after the Fourth Circuit denied petitioner survivors’ Social Security benefits 
raised questions as to the correctness of that decision. Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 165 
(1996). In Stutson, an intervening Supreme Court precedent—Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. 
Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380 (1993)—called the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion into 
question. Lawrence, 516 U.S. 163, 184–85 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the 
Eleventh Circuit’s refusal to apply the Pioneer standard in Stutson, 516 U.S. 193 (1996)). 
228 Lawrence, 516 U.S. at 167. 
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the confusion as to what the Supreme Court expects on remand. 
Denying certiorari would also maintain the Court’s adversity to 
merely correcting error, whereas regulating the Solicitor General’s 
confession of error practice by statute or returning to the Young 
standard would force the Court to engage in much more error 
correction.
229
  
Denying certiorari would also not debilitate the Court’s interest in 
letting possible circuit splits percolate before they grant review. If a 
circuit split does in fact exist, the lower court will likely have a future 
opportunity to clarify its departure from other circuits on a particular 
issue in future cases.
230
 Furthermore, in Stutson, where the court 
explicitly GVR’d to investigate a possible circuit split, its 
investigation was in vain because the Eleventh Circuit, on remand, 
vacated in part and reversed in part without a written opinion.
231
 Thus, 
the Court’s GVR was not helpful for that purpose.  
Finally, while denying certiorari would not be as “fair” to the 
petitioner as GVR’ing, the Court’s focus has generally not been so 
narrow as to remedy any one litigant’s wrongs, but rather is to 
consider principles of law with wide public interest and impact.
232
 
Moreover, Chief Justice Taft succinctly encapsulated the scope of 
fairness to a litigant in the appellate process when he asserted that 
fairness to a litigant is ensured in “one appeal [to a circuit court], 
[and] not two.”233 
Denying certiorari in rationale-confession-of-error cases would 
significantly prevent government attorneys from engaging in 
manipulative litigation practices, decrease separation of power 
problems, and remove from the executive branch some of its ability to 
develop the law through controversial litigation tactics. It would also 
                                                                                                                 
229 See Bruhl, supra note 9, at 713 (noting that the GVR is really a kind of “error 
correction”). 
230 See John Paul Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66 JUDICATURE 177, 182–
83 (1982) (stating that while uniformity of law among the federal courts is good, judicial 
restraint in resolving conflicts among the courts of appeals may “produce the most desirable 
result”). 
231 United States v. Stutson, 89 F.3d 853 (1996). 
232 See Arthur D. Hellman, Error Correction, Lawmaking, and the Supreme Court’s 
Exercise of Discretionary Review, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 795, 798 (1983) (quoting Chief Justice 
Taft as saying, “[t]he function of the Supreme Court is . . . not the remedying of a particular 
litigant’s wrong, but the consideration of cases whose decision involves principles, the 
application of which are [sic] of wide public or governmental interest, and which should be 
authoritatively declared by the final court.”) (citation omitted); see also GRESSMAN, supra note 
61, at 64 (stating that a practitioner seeking the Supreme Court’s review of his or her case 
should be aware that “the Court is not a tribunal of general errors and appeals, that it is a 
national tribunal that can afford to listen only to issues of national significance.”) (quotation 
omitted).  
233 CAPLAN, supra note 28, at 6. 
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save lower courts the embarrassment of being both unnecessarily 
questioned and asked to redo work which was not truly erroneous.
234
 
If the government understands that the Court will not automatically 
GVR whenever it confesses error, it will focus much more energy on 
“getting its position ‘right’ in the courts of appeals.”235 And, the 
Solicitor General would not be seen as a de facto justice, but as an 
advisor merely highlighting errors in the proceeding below. Thus, the 
Solicitor would remain as a valuable filtering tool in the Court’s 
certiorari evaluation process.  
The Solicitor General or the Court, however, may not always be 
able to identify when an error in a lower court’s analysis was 
definitely outcome determinative. Yet, the analytical error may be so 
significant that there is a chance that it may have led to an error in the 
judgment. Therefore, some exceptions to this Note’s proposal are 
necessary. For example, the Court in Youngblood identified a 
significant error in the West Virginia Supreme Court’s analysis of 
petitioner’s conviction: they did not adequately evaluate 
Youngblood’s Brady claim.236 From the Court’s perspective, this 
error may have resulted in an incorrect judgment or it may not 
have.
237
 Denying certiorari would not have been appropriate in 
Youngblood because the error was so significant and the possibility 
that it was outcome determinative was so real.
238
 Furthermore, 
Youngblood was a criminal case, in which an error in justice has 
much more serious and long-lasting effects, and the burden of 
ensuring a fair trial is much higher.
239
  
                                                                                                                 
234 See, e.g., Price v. United States, 537 U.S. 1152, 1157 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“This Court has no grounds on which to set aside the Fifth Circuit’s judgment, since the 
Government has not conceded error in that judgment- and indeed insists that it is correct.”).  
235 Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 187 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
236 Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 869 (2006) (per curiam). 
237 See id. at 870 (acknowledging that Youngblood presented a Brady claim and that it 
would be better for the Supreme Court of West Virginia to analyze the claim before the United 
States Supreme Court would reach the issue). Ultimately, it was decided that the error was 
outcome determinative because the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed itself 
on remand. State v. Youngblood, 650 S.E.2d 119, 122 (2007). 
238 For cases in which the error may not have been significant or outcome determinative, 
see Machado v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 1236, 1236 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting 
petitioner never argued that they deserved a non-constitutional remedy to ineffective assistance 
of counsel, yet the Court GVR’d for the Fourth Circuit to consider this claim); Price v. United 
States, 537 U.S. 1152, 1157 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the petitioner could not 
be given the maximum sentence for carrying a weapon during a “drug trafficking crime” 
because he was only found guilty of simple possession and not drug trafficking, yet the 
applicable statute did not require petitioner to be convicted of committing a “drug trafficking 
crime” but only found beyond a reasonable doubt to have committed such a crime while 
carrying a gun).  
239 See Cox, supra note 24, at 223: 
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Thus, a bright-line requirement that the government must identify 
an error in the judgment would not be useful in a case like 
Youngblood. Rather, an exception should apply that maintains the 
Court’s “reasonably probable” touchstone from Lawrence, yet applies 
additional criteria encouraging the Court to be more skeptical of the 
Solicitor’s confessions. Such an exception may look like this: where 
(1) the petitioner claims that a constitutional right or standard was 
violated or ignored in a prior proceeding, or by some other 
government actor such as a police officer, (2) the lower court did not 
fully answer that claim, and (3) it is reasonably probable that the legal 
standard that the lower court did not consider, or ignored, would 
change the case’s outcome, a GVR for fuller consideration is 
appropriate.  
Such an exception would allow the Court to remand Youngblood 
but deny certiorari in, for example, Machado, Price, and Alvarado. In 
Machado and Price, the petitioner never asserted that a constitutional 
right was ignored or violated by the trial court or court of appeals.
240
 
In Alvarado, the petitioner did claim that his Sixth Amendment right 
to an impartial jury was violated, and the Second Circuit did not 
properly address this claim, but, as the Solicitor General pointed out, 
reconsideration would not have changed the case’s outcome because 
the petitioner failed to prove a prima facie Batson violation.
241
  
Furthermore, this three-prong proposal would leave non-
constitutional errors, like in Knox, Lawrence, and Stutson, under the 
general proposal of denying rationale-confessions-of-error unless the 
Solicitor General can assert that the lower court’s erroneous rationale 
was outcome determinative. In other words, where the error is non-
constitutional, the error must control the judgment. This would limit 
                                                                                                                 
 
It is in the criminal cases that the differences between the government’s role, as we 
conceive it, and the role of the all-out advocate, become most apparent. In the 
criminal cases an extraordinary amount of time is spent in looking to see whether the 
accused really did have a fair trial, and whether the conviction really should stand. 
240 See Machado, 130 S.Ct. at 1236 (remanding for the Fourth Circuit to reconsider a non-
constitutional remedy); Price, 537 U.S. at 1152 (remanding for the Fifth Circuit to reconsider its 
application of a federal statute). 
241 See Brief for the United States in Opposition at 14, Alvarado v. United States, 497 U.S. 
543 (1990) (No. 89–6985): 
[W]hile the Second Circuit’s analysis was facially different from the analysis this 
Court prescribed in Batson . . . few if any cases will come out differently under the 
two approaches. As we have indicated in our analysis of the case under the principles 
of Batson, this is certainly not a case that would be decided differently depending on 
which route the court took to its decision. 
 2/14/2012 4:30:52 PM 
2012] RATIONALE-CONFESSIONS-OF-ERROR 917 
the breadth of cases in which the government can behave 
strategically. While the Solicitor may still confess error strategically 
by pointing to an ignored or violated constitutional right or standard, 
GVR’ing is justified on the idea that constitutional rights or standards 
must be evaluated much more earnestly and thus should not require 
the Solicitor to prove that the constitutional error was definitely 
outcome determinative. The Solicitor, however, need only show that 
it could have been outcome determinative. 
Therefore, this proposal would make the Court’s response to the 
Solicitor General’s confessions of error much more thoughtful and 
nuanced, and much less mechanical. It would ensure that lower courts 
properly reconsider only those cases where the possible error is 
serious enough to warrant reconsideration. And, it would ensure that 
the Supreme Court closes those cases whose errors are 
inconsequential, despite what the Solicitor’s Office may believe. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s mechanical deference to the Solicitor 
General whenever he confesses error in a lower court’s rationale has 
created or exacerbated various problems. Principally, it allows the 
government greater opportunity to engage in manipulative and 
strategic litigation practices, gives the Solicitor General substantial 
control over the development of the law, and negatively impacts the 
relationship of the Supreme Court with lower courts. These problems 
overbalance the benefits of GVR’ing the Solicitor’s rationale-
confessions-of-error. Therefore, this Note proposes that instead of 
according the Solicitor so much deference, the Court deny certiorari 
in rationale-confession-of-error cases where the Solicitor cannot show 
that the error controlled the judgment, or cannot show that (1) the 
petitioner was denied a constitutional right or standard in a prior 
proceeding, or by some other government actor such as a police 
officer, (2) the lower court did not fully answer that claim, and (3) it 
is reasonably probable that the legal standard that the lower court did 
not consider, or ignored, would change the case’s outcome. 
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